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COMMENTS
LIMITED LIABILITY FOR SHAREHOLDERS IN VIRGINIA
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS: FACT OR FICTION?
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1970, Virginia enacted the Professional Corporation Act' which per-
mits members of certain professions to form corporations for the purpose
of rendering professional services. 2 It is available to most professionals as
an alternative to practicing individually or in partnerships. While many
professionals have formed such corporations to avail themselves of certain
tax benefits, 3 others have formed professional corporations simply to gain
the advantages of practicing in the corporate form. One traditional ad-
vantage of the corporate form is that shareholders are shielded from per-
sonal liability for the negligent acts committed by agents or employees of
the corporation and for the debts or obligations of the corporation.4 Given
the current escalation in malpractice liability, the possibility of limited
liability may indeed be the primary allure of professional corporations to
many professionals today.5
Unfortunately, the extent of shareholder liability in professional corpo-
rations is not at all certain. At first blush, the language of the Virginia
Professional Corporation Act's liability provision is unequivocal.6 In es-
sence, the provision states that shareholders in a professional corporation
["PC"] enjoy the same limited liability as that enjoyed by shareholders in
1. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-542 to -556 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
2. Under the Virginia professional corporation statute, the term "professional service" is
defined as "any type of personal service to the public which requires as a condition prece-
dent to the rendering of such service or use of such title the obtaining of a license, certifica-
tion or other legal authorization. . . ." Id. § 13.1-543(A). The statute allows the following
professions to practice in professional corporations: pharmacists; physicians; optometrists;
psychologists; psychiatrists; therapists; veterinarians; surgeons; dentists; architects; profes-
sional engineers; land surveyors; certified landscape architects; public accountants; certified
public accounts; and attorneys-at-law. Id.
3. These tax advantages were effectively eliminated in 1982. See infra note 17 and accom-
panying text.
4. See generally 13A W. FLETcHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§
6213 to 6221 (rev. perm. ed. 1984).
5. Limited liability has been cited as a principal nontax advantage of professional corpo-
rations. See 1 PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION HANDBOOK 1 155 at 1044 (CCH 1974); Note, Nel-
son v. Patrick: More Problems for Professional Corporations, 64 N.C.L. REV. 1216-19 (1986).
6. See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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a general business corporation.7 However, the statute has yet to be con-
strued by a Virginia court, and a thorough analysis of the provision in
light of other state decisions interpreting similar statutory language
reveals ambiguities in the provision which may translate into a more ex-
tended liability for PC shareholders. In short, PCs in Virginia may cur-
rently be operating under a false sense of security regarding the personal
liability exposure of member shareholders.
This comment examines the liability provision in Virginia's Profes-
sional Corporation Act, and explores its ambiguities in light of recent case
law in other jurisdictions. It recommends changes to the statutory lan-
guage which hopefully would enable the statute to withstand some of the
attacks successfully leveled at similar liability provisions in other state
PC acts.
A. The Purpose of Professional Corporation Statutes
Initially, PC statutes were enacted not to limit professional liability,
but to extend corporate tax treatment to certain professional associa-
tions.8 Before enactment of PC statutes, professionals practiced individu-
ally, in partnerships or in professional associations.' In these forms, they
were unable to take advantage of an Internal Revenue Code provision"0
permitting employees to exclude from gross income certain employer-pro-
vided fringe benefits, such as retirement plans and insurance coverage. 1
In 1935, however, the United States Supreme Court in Morrissey v.
Commissioner12 ruled that unincorporated business organizations should
be taxed as corporations if they exhibit certain corporate characteristics."
These characteristics include: (1) centralized management; (2) continuity
of life; (3) limited liability; and (4) ease of transferability of interest.'
7. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-547 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
8. For an in-depth treatment of the tax history of professional corporations, see Phillips,
McNider & Riley, Origins of Tax Law: The History of the Professional Service Corpora-
tion, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 433 (1983); Bowman, The Professional Corporation: Has the
Death Knell Been Sounded?, 10 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 515 (1983).
9. Traditionally, professionals were not allowed to incorporate. In Virginia, accountants,
architects, attorneys, doctors, engineers and land surveyors have been denied the privileges
of corporate practice. See Horsley, The Virginia Professional Association Act: Relief for the
Underprivileged, 48 VA. L. REv. 777, 778 & n.7 (1962). The noncorporate status of the pro-
fessional was considered necessary to foster professionals' role as service providers, rather
than businessmen. Id. at 778.
10. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (1985); see also Arnold, Professional Corporations in Oklahoma, 17
TULSA L.J. 1, 3 n.10 (1981).
11. Retirement plans include deferred compensation plans, qualified pension plans and
profit-sharing plans. Insurance benefits include life, health, medical and disability insur-
ance. See Note, supra note 5, at 1219 n.35.
12. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
13. Id. at 359-60.
14. Id.
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In 1960, the Internal Revenue Service promulgated regulations 15 which
were consistent with the Morrissey criteria. Specifically, the regulations
provided that where professional associations possessed the corporate at-
tributes identified in Morrissey, the professionals associated with the as-
sociation would be deemed employees of the association and would be
eligible for the favorable tax treatment of fringe benefits given to corpo-
rate employees.18
However, the tax benefits conferred on professional associations and
corporations were effectively eliminated in 1982 by the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, which treated partnerships and corpo-
rations similarly.17
It is clear from the history of professional association and professional
corporation acts that they were enacted primarily to extend corporate tax
treatment to professional associations and not to confer limited liability
on their members.' One commentator has observed:
15. Trees. Reg. § 301.7701 (1960). The regulations have been referred to as the "Kintner
regulations" because they were promulgated in response to the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decision in United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954), holding that an
association of physicians was taxable as a corporation despite a state common-law prohibi-
tion against the incorporation of physicians. 216 F.2d at 428.
Note that the Kintner regulations applied to professional associations only. Corporations
formed under professional corporation statutes are deemed true corporations and, as such,
are entitled to corporate tax treatment irrespective of the Kintner regulations. See Maier,
Don't Confuse Kintner-Type Associations with New Professional Corporations, 15 J. TAX'N
248, 248 (1961).
In 1961, Virginia and 15 other states enacted professional association statutes in response
to the Kintner regulations. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-873 to -898 (Repl. Vol. 1982). For a
detailed discussion of Virginia's professional association statute, see Horsley, supra note 9.
16. Tress. Reg. § 301.7701 (1960). With regard to limited liability, the regulations speci-
fied: "An organization has the corporate characteristic of limited liability if under local law,
there is no member who is personally liable for the debts of or claims against the organiza-
tion." Id. § 301.7701-2(d)(1).
17. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324.
The parity and nondiscrimination provisions of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982 elevated the unincorporated retirement plan and lowered the corporate retire-
ment plan to nearly the same levels. See Bowman, supra note 8, at 543.
18. See, e.g., Vinall v. Hoffman, 133 Ariz. 322, -, 651 P.2d 850, 851-52 (1982) ("primary
reason for creating the professional corporation was to permit professionals to take advan-
tage of various federal tax provisions available to a corporation and its employees but not
available to self-employed persons or partnerships"); In re Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554, 556
(Fla. 1961) (purpose of statute to place professionals "on an equal footing with other tax-
payers"); In re Bar Ass'n of Hawaii, 55 Hawaii 121, -, 516 P.2d 1267, 1268 (1973) (purpose
of statute to "place professional persons on parity with persons in other business corpora-
tions who are favored with tax benefits .... "; In re Rhode Island Bar Ass'n, 106 R.I. 752,
-, 263 A.2d 692, 695 (1970) (purpose of statute to "enable members of the covered profes-
sions not previously allowed to incorporate, to form corporations, thus putting such mem-
bers on an equal footing with other taxpayers.").
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To be sure, there are justifications other than tax savings advanced in de-
fense of the professional corporation. It remains, at bottom, a creature of
the aberrations of the Internal Revenue Code, a totally artificial device re-
sorted to almost entirely for the purpose of avoiding taxes-a symptom, not
the source, of the real problem.' 9
Given the fact that professional associations and corporations need no
longer be formed in order for professionals to be given the same tax treat-
ment as corporate employees, there must be another reason for profes-
sionals to select the PC as the vehicle for the practice of their profession.
As noted earlier, many find the prospect of limited liability a sufficient
justification for forming a PC.20 Though all states have professional cor-
poration or professional association statutes dealing with the question of
shareholder liability, they deal with the subject in diverse ways.2 More-
over, the statutes have been subjected to a variety of interpretations, even
where the statutory language is very clear.22 Although the law in this area
is unsettled, some conclusions can be drawn that allow a clearer liability
provision in Virginia's PC statute to be drafted.
II. THE VIRGINIA PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION STATUTE'S LIABILITY
PROVISION
Virginia's PC statute contains a provision addressing shareholder liabil-
ity.2" The provision reads:
The provisions of this chapter shall not be construed to alter or affect the
professional relationship between a person furnishing professional services
and a person receiving such service either with respect to liability arising
out of such professional service or the confidential relationship between the
person rendering the professional service and the person receiving such pro-
A number of commentators speculated that with the major tax benefits eliminated, pro-
fessional associations and professional corporations would disappear. See, e.g., Bowman,
supra note 8, at 543 ("with the new IRS allocation powers provided by TEFRA, the profes-
sional corporation may well have been dealt the final blow"); Phillips, supra note 8, at 455
("By virture [sic] of the reduced marginal benefits available to incorporated service-provid-
ers, the enactment of TEFRA likely will decrease the number of PSC's incorporated in the
future.").
19. Bowman, supra note 8, at 516; see also Horsley, supra note 9, at 778 (professional
corporations are means to tax-related ends).
20. See supra note 5.
21. See Comment, Shareholder Liability in Professional Legal Corporations: A Survey of
the States, 47 U. Prir. L. REv. 817 (1986). The author categorized the statutory liability
provisions into three basic groups: (1) complete limited liability, except for the shareholder's
own negligence; (2) liability limited to the misconduct committed by the shareholder or any
person under his direct supervision; (3) vicarious liability of shareholders for the negligence
of other shareholders and employees. Id.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 41-74.
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-547 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
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fessional service, if any, and all such confidential relationships enjoyed
under the laws of this Commonwealth, whether now in existence, or hereaf-
ter enacted, shall remain inviolate.24
A director, officer, agent or employee of a professional corporation shall
not, by reason of being any director, officer, agent or employee of such cor-
poration, be personally liable for any debts or claims against, or the acts or
omissions of the corporation or of another director, officer, agent or em-
ployee of the corporation, but the corporation shall be liable for the acts or
omissions of its directors, officers, agents, employees and servants to the
same extent to which any other corporation would be liable for the acts or
omissions of its directors, officers, agents, employees and servants while
they are engaged in carrying on the corporate business.
25
A. The Saving Clause
The first paragraph26 of the provision is referred to by most commenta-
tors2 7 as a "saving clause" and is present in some form in nearly all state
professional corporation statutes.2 8 The intent of most saving clauses is to
preserve, to some extent, the common-law relationship between profes-
sional and client/patient, as well as the traditional liability arising out of
that relationship. 2 The extent to which the saving clause preserves any
liability arising out of the professional relationship is subject to debate.
There are at least three interpretations: 30 (1) the saving clause is meant
only to preserve the liability of the professional for his own tortious con-
duct; (2) the saving clause preserves the liability of the professional for
his own tortious conduct and the tortious conduct of those directly under
his supervision; (3) the saving clause preserves the traditional partnership
liability 1 for the tortious conduct of the professional, those directly
24. Section 13.1-547 reads as a single paragraph. It has been divided into two separate
paragraphs for purposes of this discussion.
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-547. In order to render professional services on behalf of the
corporation, the shareholder must be an employee, agent or officer of the corporation. Id. §
13.1-546.
26. See supra note 24.
27. See, e.g., Note, Professional Corporations and Associations, 75 HARV. L. REv. 776
(1962); Comment, supra note 21, at 834-35.
28. See Bittker, Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxation: Some Ques-
tions and Comments, 17 TAX L. REv. 1, 9 (1961). Professor Bittker hypothesized that the
saving clause was included by state legislatures to assuage fears that the new professional
corporation statutes would adversely affect clients. Id.; see also supra note 9.
29. See Note, supra note 27, at 780-81.
30. Id.
31. Partners in a partnership are jointly and severally liable for the tortious conduct of all
the other partners as well as that of any employees of the partnership. See VA. CODE ANN. §
50-15(a) (Repl. Vol. 1986); see also E.H. Parrish & Co. v. Pulley, 126 Va. 319, 101 S.E. 236
(1919) (negligence of one partner is negligence of all); McCormick v. Romans, 214 Va. 144,
198 S.E.2d 651 (1973) (plaintiff may sue partners individually and need not name the part-
nership as a party defendant).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
under his supervision, and other shareholders in the corporation.32
Reading the Virginia provision as a whole leads to the preliminary con-
clusion that the General Assembly intended that the saving clause pre-
serve only the liability of the professional for his own tortious conduct.
The second and third interpretations appear to be precluded by the sec-
ond paragraph of the provision which expressly states that professionals
in a PC will not be personally liable for the debts or liabilities of the
corporation, or for the negligent acts of any other employee, officer, or
director of the corporation.
33
1. The Professional Association Act Liability Provision
The interpretation that the Virginia saving clause preserves only the
liability of the professional for his own negligence is buttressed by an ex-
amination of the Professional Association Act ["PA Act"].34 The purpose
of the PA Act was to allow professionals to form unincorporated associa-
tions in order to take advantage of tax benefits granted to such organiza-
tions.3" Although the provisions of the PA Act parallel the provisions of
the PC Act, its liability provision differs from the PC liability provision.
The PA Act provision contains a saving clause nearly identical to the
32. Arguably, this interpretation of the saving clause is untenable in light of the IRS'
original requirement that professional associations and professional corporations have the
attribute of limited liability. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, five
states-Arizona, Colorado, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Wyoming-have PC statutes which con-
tain liability provisions requiring shareholders to retain joint and several liability for the
tortious conduct of the corporation, its employees and other shareholders. See ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 10-905 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 265 (Colorado makes an exception for the PC
with adequate insurance to cover the claim); O. REV. STAT. § 58.185 (1981); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.99(8) (West Cum. Supp. 1986) (Wisconsin excepts debts and other contractual obliga-
tions of the corporation); WYo. STAT. § 17-3-102 (1977); see Comment, supra note 21, at 820-
21.
33. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
34. As noted supra note 15, Virginia enacted a Professional Association Statute in 1961.
Because the General Assembly does not record its legislative history, it is not clear why
Virginia enacted both a professional association act and a professional corporation act. Only
eight other states have done so: Georgia; Tennessee; Illinois; Pennsylvania; Nevada; Con-
necticut; Alabama; and Texas. See PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION HANDBOOK 4008 (CCH
1984).
Although one commentator has maintained that professional associations and professional
corporations are distinct entities, see Maier, supra note 15, at 248, they are nevertheless
both creatures of the same need for tax equality. See supra text accompanying notes 18 and
19.
Section 13.1-545 of the PC act provides that a professional association can become a pro-
fessional corporation, provided that such merger became effective prior to July 1, 1972. This
section provides further that the professional association's articles of association shall be
deemed to contain all the corporate powers and purposes of a professional corporation. VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-545 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
35. See supra notes 8-18 and accompanying text.
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one in the PC Act.36 However, the PA Act provision expressly preserves
the liability of the professional for the negligence or wrongful act of any
person "under his direct supervision or control. '37 It is therefore arguable
that had the General Assembly wished to preserve more than the liability
of the professional for his own misconduct, it would have adopted the
express language of the PA provision.
2. Apparent Superfluity of the Saving Clause
While the intent of the General Assembly appears clear with respect to
the saving clause, interpreting the clause to preserve only the liability of
the professional for his own negligence makes little sense.3s An employee
of a corporation is liable for his own negligence notwithstanding the con-
current liability of his employer under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior.39 Accordingly, the professional is liable for his own negligence with
or without the saving clause. Thus, under this interpretation, the saving
clause adds nothing to the professional's liability that does not exist with-
out the saving clause. To be meaningful, then, the saving clause must pre-
serve liability beyond that of the professional for his own negligence.
36. The saving clause reads:
The provisions of this chapter shall not be construed to alter or affect the profes-
sional relationship between a person furnishing professional services and a person
receiving such service, either with respect to liability arising out of such professional
service or the confidential relationship between the person rendering the professional
service and the person receiving such professional service, if any, and all such confi-
dential relationships enjoyed under the laws of this State, whether now in existence
or hereafter enacted, shall remain inviolate.
VA. CODE ANN. § 54-886 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
37. Section 54-892 reads:
Any associate of a professional association shall remain personally and fully liable
and accountable for any negligent or wrongful acts, or misconduct committed by him,
or by any person under his direct supervision and control, while rendering profes-
sional services on behalf of the association to the person for whom such professional
services were being rendered. Such associate shall not, by reason of being an associ-
ate, be personally liable for any debts or claims against, or the acts or omissions of
the association or of another associate or employee of the association, but the associa-
tion shall be liable for the acts or omissions of its associates, officers, agents, employ-
ees and servants to the same extent to which a corporation would be liable for the
acts or omissions of its officers, agents, employees and servants while they are en-
gaged in carrying on the corporate business.
VA. CODE ANN. § 54-892 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
38. See Bittker, supra note 28, at 9.
39. See generally D. DOBBS, R. KEATON, D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 70
(5th ed. 1984).
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III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF STATE PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
STATUTES
While interpreting the saving clause to preserve only the liability of the
professional for his own negligence renders the clause superfluous, inter-
preting it to preserve a more extended liability would be inconsistent with
the limited liability language in the provision. This inconsistency makes
the Virginia provision susceptible to judicial whim should the statute be
invoked in a negligence action against a PC. Other state PC acts with
liability provisions similar to Virginia's have been subjected to twisted
interpretations for a variety of public policy reasons. Despite limited lia-
bility language in their state's PC act, courts have found that profession-
als should be held liable for the wrongful conduct of other members or
employees of the PC.
A. Professional Legal Corporations
First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria4 1 is illustrative of the sort of reason-
ing employed by courts to circumvent limited liability language in PC
statutes. In that case, the Georgia Supreme Court held the defendant, a
lawyer in a professional legal corporation, liable for checks refused by the
bank because of insufficient funds. The defendant was found liable even
though the checks were issued by another member of the law firm and the
defendant was not a party to the transaction in question.42
Georgia's PC statute is substantively similar to Virginia's. Subsection
(a) of the Georgia statute contains a saving clause4" which is followed by
subsection (b) which provides:
Subject to subsection (a) of this Code section, the members or shareholders
of any professional association organized pursuant to this chapter shall not
be individually liable for the debts of, or claims against, the professional
association unless such member or shareholder has personally participated
in the transaction for which the debt or claim is made or out of which it
arises.44
Virtually ignoring subsection (b), the court in Zagoria stated that it
would "make no distinction between partnerships and professional corpo-
rations" with respect to professional liability.45 The court reasoned that
limited liability would drastically alter the relationship between the pro-
fessional corporation and its clients. Vicarious liability must be preserved
40. See supra text accompanying note 25.
41. 250 Ga. 844, 302 S.E.2d 674 (1983).
42. Id. at -, 302 S.E.2d at 676.
43. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-10-7(a) (1982).
44. Id. § 14-10-7(b).
45. 250 Ga. at -, 302 S.E.2d at 676.
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in order to protect adequately the client's expectations that the entire
corporation would be engaged on his behalf.4 To ensure that the practice
of law would not become merely a commercial venture but remain a pro-
fessional service with its highest obligation being the public interest, the
court concluded that "a corporate veil [must not be allowed] to hang from
the cornices of professional corporations which engage in the practice of
law.' 4
The holding in Zagoria rested on the premise that the Georgia Su-
preme Court has the inherent power to regulate the practice of law.48 The
court conceded that the legislature has the right to enact legislation gov-
erning the creation and operation of professional corporations and pro-
viding limited liability for purely business obligations. However, the court
maintained that the Georgia PC statute could not be applied to insulate
lawyers from liability because only the court has the power to regulate
the practice of law.
49
Other states have also determined that PC statute liability provisions
are inapplicable to professional legal corporations. In In re Rhode Island
Bar Association," the Supreme Court of Rhode Island granted the re-
quest of the state bar association to permit attorneys to engage in the
practice of law in the corporate form under the state's professional service
corporation law. 1 However, the court held that lawyers practicing in PCs
will have limited liability only when they do not participate in the render-
ing of services which give rise to an actionable wrong, and will not be
personally liable for the ordinary business debts of the corporation. 5 2 The
court explained that as officers of the court, attorneys are subject to regu-
46. Id. at -. , 302 S.E.2d at 676. The court proclaimed, "[ilt is inappropriate for the law-
yer to be able to play hide and seek in the shadows and folds of the corporate veil and thus
escape the responsibilities of professionalism." Id. at -, 302 S.E.2d at 675.
47. Id. at -, 302 S.E.2d at 676.
48. Id. at -, 302 S.E.2d at 675. The court declared:
We do not view this case as one in which we need to interpret that statute provid-
ing for the creation and operation of professional corporations. We rather view this
case as one which calls for the exercise of this court's authority to regulate the prac-
tice of law. This court has the authority and in fact the duty to regulate the law
practice and in the past two decades we have been diligent in our exercise of this
duty ....
The diligence of this court has been directed toward the assurance that the law
practice will be a professional service and not simply a commercial enterprise. The
primary distinction is that a profession is a calling which demands adherence to the
public interest as the foremost obligation of the practitioner.
Id. at -, 302 S.E.2d at 675.
49. Id. at -, 302 S.E.2d at 675 (legislature "cannot contitutionally cross the gulf separat-
ing the branches of government by imposing regulations upon the practice of law").
50. 106 R.I. 752, 263 A.2d 692 (1970); see R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-5.1-1 to 5.1-12 (1985).
51. 106 R.I. 752, 263 A.2d 692.
52. Id. at -, 263 A.2d at 697; see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.1-8 (1985) (providing that profes-
sional corporations must carry liability insurance).
580 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:571
lation by the court.53 Thus, though statutorily authorized, legal practice
in the corporate form must be authorized by the state supreme court.54
Although no Virginia court has construed the Virginia PC statute, the
Virginia Supreme Court has the same inherent power to regulate the
practice of law as does the Georgia Supreme Court.5 It is not difficult to
conceive of a case in which a court could find that the preservation of
high standards of professionalism requires that the limited liability lan-
guage be set aside. Where, for example, an associate attorney commits
professional malpractice resulting in substantial loss to the client and the
PC has no insurance coverage, the court could conclude that preservation
of the high standards of the legal profession mandate that a shareholder
attorney be held liable.
B. Professional Medical Corporations
Although the inherent power of courts to regulate the practice of law
may provide a justification for ignoring limited liability language in PC
statutes, there are decisions involving other professions which also abro-
gate the limited liability language of PC statutes. In Boyd v.
Badenhausen,51 the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the veil of a
professional medical corporation does not protect its members from per-
sonal responsibility for the negligence of its corporate employees. 57 Boyd
involved a lawsuit against a physician for damages caused by a delay be-
tween the time the patient contended that surgery should have been per-
formed and the time when surgery was actually performed. The delay oc-
curred because one of the physician's employees misplaced the patient's
53. 106 R.I. at -, 263 A.2d at 696. The court stated:
The profession will not become a mere business operation or commercial venture.
Under the strict direction and control of this court, and in keeping with the highest
traditions of the bar, it will continue to dedicate itself to the administration of justice
in accordance with the oath or affirmation taken by every person seeking admission
to the bar of this state. In substance, insofar as the relationship of attorney and client
and of attorney and the general public is concerned, practice in corporate form will be
as we have previously pointed out, substantially similar to the practice of law as it
presently exists in firms operating as law partnerships.
Id. at -, 263 A.2d at 698.
54. Id.; see also In re Bar Ass'n of Hawaii, 55 Haw. 121, -, 516 P.2d 1267, 1268 (1973)
(permitting attorneys to practice in professional corporations but denying limited liability
because limited liability would result in derogation of the attorney-client relationship).
55. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54-48 (Repl. Vol. 1982); cf. Woodard v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Ex-
aminers, 454 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. Va. 1978), a/I'd, 598 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1979) (though Vir-
ginia Supreme Court has no explicit statutory authority to review the Board's decisions or
to reverse its evaluation of a particular candidate, it is well settled that the court retains
such inherent power).
56. 556 S.W.2d 896 (Ky. 1977).
57. Id. at 898.
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file. 58 In spite of a professional corporation statute shielding shareholders
from liability for the negligence of the corporation's employees, 59 the
court found the physician responsible for the "derelictions of persons em-
ployed by [the] corporation to carry out for him the clerical details that
are necessary to the successful performance of his duty to render skillful
care and attention to whomever he accepts as a patient."60 The court ex-
plained that if the physician had been an "old-fashioned country doctor
without any office help and had mislaid his notes," he would certainly be
held liable.6" The court concluded that "[pilacing a layer of other people
* * * between a physician and his patient does not alter the situation, be-
cause the physician's professional duties are not susceptible of being dele-
gated or diffused." 6'
Similarly, in the recent case of Nelson v. Patrick,6s the North Carolina
Court of Appeals interpreted the North Carolina PC statute's saving
clause6 4 to require that members of a professional medical corporation be
held jointly and severally liable for one of the other member's negli-
gence.65 Nelson involved a medical malpractice action against two radi-
ologists and the professional corporation of which they were members.
Plaintiff had undergone a complete hysterectomy and was advised by her
gynecologist to undergo radiation therapy to reduce the risk of cancer.6
58. Id.
59. The statute reads:
The provisions of this chapter shall not alter any law applicable to, or otherwise af-
fect the fiducial, confidential or ethical relationship between a person rendering pro-
fessional services and a person receiving such services. The corporation shall be
jointly and severally liable, with the tort-feasor, to the full value of its assets for any
negligent or wrongful acts or actionable misconduct committed by any of its officers,
shareholders, agents or employes while they are engaged on behalf of the corporation
in the rendering of professional service. Provided, however, that no shareholder, di-
rector, officer, or employe of a professional service corporation shall be personally
liable for the negligence, wrongful acts, or actionable misconduct of any other share-
holder, director, officer, agent or employe nor shall such shareholder, director, officer
or employe be personally liable for the contractual obligations of the corporation.
Ky. RV. STAT. ANN. § 274.055(1) (Baldwin 1981) (emphasis added).
60. 556 S.W.2d at 898-99.
61. Id. at 899.
62. Id.
63. 73 N.C. App. 1, 326 S.E.2d 45 (1985).
64. The saving clause states:
Nothing in this Chapter shall be interpreted to abolish, modify, restrict, limit or alter
the law in this State applicable to the professional relationship and liabilities between
the person furnishing the professional services and the person receiving such profes-
sional service, or the standards of professional conduct applicable to the rendering
therein of such services.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55B-9 (1982).
65. 73 N.C. App. at -, 326 S.E.2d at 50.
66. Id. at -, 326 S.E.2d at 47. Plaintiff's gynecologist referred her to defendants for
therapy. Id.
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As a result of the radiation treatments, plaintiff suffered damage to her
intestines."' Plaintiff alleged that the defendant who administered the ra-
diation was negligent in failing to obtain plaintiff's informed consent to
undergo radiation therapy.
6 8
The saving clause in section 55B-9 of the North Carolina PC statute is
similar to Virginia's saving clause.6 9 Section 55B-3 of the statute provides,
however, that "professional corporations . . . shall be subject to the du-
ties, restrictions and liabilities of other corporations, except insofar as the
same may be limited or enlarged by this Chapter. '70 Section 55B-3 fur-
ther provides that "[i]f any provision of this Chapter conflicts with the
provisions of the Business Corporation Act, the provisions of this Chapter
shall prevail." 71 Arguably, section 55B-3 establishes that shareholders in a
PC enjoy the same limited liability as shareholders in business corpora-
tions.7 2 The Nelson court held, however, that the traditional notion of
joint and several liability of partners in a partnership also applies to
shareholders in a PC.
7 3
The Nelson decision is not well reasoned and has been criticized.
74
Nevertheless, it is another recent instance where a court has been unwill-
ing to extend limited liability to shareholders in a PC despite the appar-
ent grant of such limited liability by the state's PC statute.
C. Judicial Acquiescence to PC Act Liability Provisions
Some courts have given effect to statutory provisions granting limited
liability to PC shareholders. For example, in Fure v. Sherman Hospital,
75
the Illinois Court of Appeals held that a physician shareholder of a pro-
fessional medical corporation formed under the Illinois Medical Corpora-
tion Act 76 and the Illinois Professional Service Corporation Act,7 7 was not
67. Id. at -, 326 S.E.2d at 47-48.
68. Id. at -, 326 S.E.2d at 48.
69. See supra note 64.
70. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55B-3 (1982). Under § 55-53(e) of the Business Corporation Act,
shareholders of a corporation have limited liability. Id. § 55-53(e).
71. Id. § 55B-3.
72. See Note, supra note 5, at 1221-22.
73. 73 N.C. App. at -, 326 S.E.2d at 50; see supra note 31.
74. See Note, supra note 5, at 1221. There is virtually no explanation given by the court
for its holding. The court merely cited the saving clause in the North Carolina professional
corporation statute and quoted dicta from Zimmerman v. Hogg & Allen, 286 N.C. 24, 30,
209 S.E.2d 795, 798 (1974). The issue in Zimmerman, however, was whether a professional
association could be held liable under a theory of apparent authority for the misappropria-
tion of funds by one of its employees. The Zimmerman court did not consider the question
of joint and several liability of PC shareholders. See Note, supra note 5, at 1221.
75. 55 Ill. App. 3d 572, 371 N.E.2d 143 (1977).
76. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 32, paras. 631 to 648 (Smith-Hurd 1970 & Cum. Supp. 1986).
77. Id. paras. 415-1 to 415-18.
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liable for the alleged malpractice of another physician shareholder. 8 The
defendant physician's only connection with the plaintiff was his signature
on the voucher form allowing the corporation to collect fees from the
plaintiff's insurance carrier.79
The Illinois Professional Service Corporation Act provides that al-
though a shareholder will be liable for his own negligence, he otherwise
will have no greater liability for the conduct of the corporation's agents or
employees than a general business corporation. 0 Similarly, the Illinois
Medical Corporation Act provides that the physician furnishing medical
service will retain personal liability for his own conduct but not for the
conduct of any other employee or shareholder in the corporation.8 ' Ap-
plying the express language of the statutes, the Illinois court concluded
that absent any participation in the negligent acts, the defendant was en-
titled to the protection of the corporate veil.82
In O'Neill v. United States,8 3 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit held that an Ohio professional corporation statute containing a sav-
ing clause 4 and a provision stating that general corporate law would gov-
ern professional corporations, 5 "merely preserves the personal liability of
the professional man in his professional dealings ...."I'll
The O'Neill case did not involve a tort action against a PC but was
instead an action for a tax refund. Moreover, as noted earlier,87 it makes
little sense to interpret saving clauses as preserving only the profes-
sional's liability for his own negligence. The O'Neill court's statements
were, in fact, ignored by the Ohio Supreme Court in South High Develop-
ment v. Weiner,"' which held an attorney shareholder in a professional
legal corporation personally liable for the corporation's breach of its lease
of office space.8" Deciding that the Ohio Professional Corporation Act 0
has no provision directly addressing shareholder liability, the court con-
cluded that there is no need for shareholders in professional corporations
to have limited liability. The court advanced a novel justification for its
conclusion:
[A] private corporation's sole purpose is to accumulate capital so that the
78. 55 Ill. App. 3d at -, 371 N.E.2d at 145.
79. Id. at -, 371 N.E.2d at 143.
80. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 415-8 (Smith-Hurd 1970).
81. Id. para. 644.
82. 55 Ill. App. 3d at -, 371 N.E.2d at 144.
83. 410 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1969).
84. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1785.04 (Baldwin Supp. 1986).
85. Id. § 1785.08.
86. 410 F.2d at 898.
87. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
88. 4 Ohio St. 3d 1, 445 N.E.2d 1106 (1983).
89. Id. at -, 445 N.E.2d at 1109.
90. See supra notes 84 & 85.
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owners, those contributing capital, may get a return on their capital. Thus,
it may reasonably be concluded that the rationale behind the constitutional
protection for shareholders applies only toward private corporations and not
professional ones. The shareholders of a professional corporation, whether
legal, medical, or other, will be the professionals who actually practice the
profession. However, the shareholders of a private corporation will in most
instances not be employees of the corporation. Therefore, there is a logical
need for shareholders of private corporations to be insulated from corporate
debts since they will have no practical participation in the management of
the corporation. The shareholders of the professional corporation will have
direct contact with the running of the corporation, so limited liability is not
necessary for them.91
The best reasoned decision involving a malpractice action against PC
shareholders was handed down in Birt v. St. Mary's Mercy Hospital.9 2 In
that case, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that one member of a PC
could not be held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of another.9"
Birt involved a suit against a professional medical corporation which con-
tracted to provide emergency room medical services to a local hospital.
The plaintiff alleged malpractice by one of the treating physicians in the
emergency room and sought to hold all of the shareholders jointly and
severally liable.94 The court interpreted the Indiana Medical Professional
Corporation Act's saving clause, observing first that the saving clause
must preserve more than the personal liability of a corporate employee
for his own negligence.99 The court continued: "[w]ithout deciding, we
note that the statute may impose personal liability. . . for the negligence
of assistants acting under the physician's direction."97 The court rejected
the plaintiff's argument, however, that the saving clause requires share-
holders in professional corporations to be held vicariously liable for the
torts of other shareholders:
The [PC statute] manifests legislative intent that medical professional cor-
porations be imbued with as many of the attributes of general corporations
91. 4 Ohio St. 3d at -, 445 N.E.2d at 1108. The court apparently failed to take into
account the realities of many close corporations in which the business is run by the
shareholders.
92. 175 Ind. App. 32, 370 N.E.2d 379 (1977).
93. Id. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 385.
94. Id. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 380.
95. Id. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 382. The saving clause provides: "This act does not modify
any law applicable to the relationship between a person furnishing professional medical ser-
vice and a person receiving such service, including liability arising out of such professional
service." IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-14-14 (Burns 1972) (repealed) (replaced by §§ 23-1.5-1-1 to
1.5-5-2).
96. 175 Ind. App. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 383; see also supra notes 38-40 and accompanying
text.
97. Id. (citing Comment, Professional Corporations and Associations, 75 HARV. L. REV.
776 (1962)).
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as may be, without destroying the traditional professional relationship be-
tween physician and patient. We conclude that neither the express language
of the statute, nor the qualification purpose of maintaining strong profes-
sional relationships require importation of the partnership doctrine of vica-
rious liability into the professional corporate arena. Plainly general corpo-
rate concepts preclude it.9 8
The Birt court also advanced cogent responses to some of the policy
concerns raised by other courts opposing statutory grants of limited lia-
bility to PC shareholders. 9 The primary concern over limited liability is
that it would adversely affect the relationship between the professional
corporation and its clients. Vicarious liability is needed to ensure a high
standard of professionalism and dedication to public service,10 0 and to
protect the client's expectation that the entire professional team is en-
gaged on his behalf. 10 '
The Birt court observed first that penalties imposed for violations of
professional ethics are sufficient to ensure proper quality of services.2
0 2
The Birt court also recognized that although clients may expect to have
the organization's entire expertise available to him, experience shows that
a professional's relationship to the client "is often intensely personal,
rather than collective."'' Because the professional corporation itself can
be held liable for the negligence of a member, the corporation has great
incentive to use any and all professionals necessary to render effective
professional service.10 4
Another concern is that plaintiffs may be unable to collect a damage
award from a professional corporation without the existence of vicarious
liability. 0 5 This concern is also unfounded since both the corporation and
98. Id. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 385.
99. Id. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 383-85.
100. See First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 250 Ga. 844, -, 302 S.E.2d 674, 676 (1983)
(in order to foster professional dedication to public service, a "corporate veil [must not be
allowed] to hang from the cornices of professional corporations"); see also Bittker, Profes-
sional Service Organizations: A Critique of the Literature, 23 TAX. L. REV. 429, 429-30 n.1
(1968); Note, supra note 5, at 1224.
101. See Zagoria, 250 Ga. at -, 302 S.E.2d at 675 (client seeking professional services
has the right to expect the fidelity of other members of the firm).
102. 175 Ind. App. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 384; see also Paas, Professional Corporations
and Attorney-Shareholders: The Decline of Limited Liability, 11 J. CoRP. L. 371 (1986)
(courts have adequate redress against attorney shareholders in a professional legal corpora-
tion under the rules of professional responsibility).
103. 175 Ind. App. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 383.
104. See Note, supra note 5, at 1224.
105. See 175 Ind. App. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 383; see also In re Hawaii Bar Ass'n, 55
Haw. 121, -, 516 P.2d 1267, 1268 (1973) (limited liability "would not provide adequate
protection to a client's claims against a law corporation"); cf. Zagoria, 250 Ga. at -, 302
S.E.2d at 675 ("It is inappropriate for the lawyer to be able to play hide-and-seek in the
shadows and folds of the corporate veil and thus escape the responsibilities of
professionalism.").
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the negligent professional can still be held liable for the damages suffered
by the client.' s Moreover, many PCs maintain malpractice insurance suf-
ficient to cover most damage claims.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR STATUTORY CHANGE IN VIRGINIA
The extent of shareholder liability in professional corporations is unset-
tled. Even where legislative intent and statutory language are clear,
courts called upon to apply the statutes have found ways to circumvent
the statute's literal meaning. The Virginia PC statute's liability provision
is vulnerable to some of the same attacks leveled at other state statutes,
but the risk that these attacks would be successful could be reduced if the
liability provision were amended.
First, the General Assembly should state specifically the purpose of the
saving clause. As it presently stands, the Virginia saving clause is subject
to at least three different interpretations.0 7 If its purpose is to preserve
only the liability of the professional for his own negligence, the saving
clause is superfluous and should be removed by amendment. If the saving
clause means that the professional retains liability for the negligence of
other shareholders or for those under his direct supervision or control,
then it conflicts with the language in the statute providing for limited
liability. 108
The liability provision in the PC statute should be harmonized with the
liability provision in the PA Act. 09 First, if the liability provisions of both
statutes were consistent, the possibility of inconsistent results would be
minimized. There is currently a risk of confusing the professional associa-
tion act with the professional corporation act, 10 and indeed, some com-
mentators draw no distinction between the two."' Because of the dispar-
ity in the liability provisions of the two acts, a physician who happens to
be a member of a professional association could be held liable for the
negligence of his nurse while a physician who is a shareholder in a profes-
sional corporation apparently could not be held vicariously liable. This
would be true regardless of whether the facts surrounding the alleged
negligence were identical in both cases or whether they were more egre-
gious in the case of the professional corporation.
106. Birt, 175 Ind. App. at -, 370 N.E.3d at 383; see also Note supra note 5, at 1226.
107. See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
110. See Maier, supra note 15, at 248 (warning against confusing professional associations
with professional corporations); see also Comment, supra note 21, at 826 n. 54 (citing Vir-
ginia Professional Association Act in discussion of state professional corporation acts).
111. See Comment, supra note 21; cf. Horsley, supra note 9, at 778 ("professional corpo-
ration or association is but a means to an end").
[Vol. 21:571
LIMITED LIABILITY FOR SHAREHOLDERS
Harmonizing the two provisions would also have the advantage of clari-
fying the meaning of the saving clause. If the PC Statute expressly pro-
vides, as does the PA Act, that professionals will remain liable for the
negligence of those directly under their supervision, there would be less
room for speculation about the meaning of the saving clause and less like-
lihood that a court would decide that the saving clause requires the pro-
fessional to be held liable for the negligence of all other shareholders.
Finally, the liability provision should be amended to require PCs to
maintain an adequate amount of liability insurance. This requirement
would ensure that clients served by the corporation will not suffer be-
cause of limited liability. '
CONCLUSION
The suggested changes, if adopted, would not guarantee that Virginia
courts would honor the PC statute's liability provision. In the case of a
professional legal corporation, the court may invoke its power to regulate
the practice of law and determine that limited liability should not be
available to attorneys. The recommended changes would, however, elimi-
nate the ambiguities in the liability provision and make it much easier for
courts to apply. Moreover, the changes would give better guidance to pro-
112. Other state PC acts contain such a requirement. For example, Rhode Island's Profes-
sional Services Corporation Act provides:
Every professional service corporation shall maintain insurance against any liability
imposed by law upon the corporation or its employees arising out of the performance
of professional services .... Such insurance shall be ... with respect to each claim,
in the aggregate amount of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) multiplied by the number
of professional employees of the corporation as of the policy anniversary date; Pro-
vided, however, that in no case shall the coverage be less than one hundred thousand
dollars ($100,000) and not more than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) ....
R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-5.1-8 (Supp. 1985). Colorado also requires PCs to maintain adequate
insurance. If Colorado PCs fail to maintain adequate insurance, then shareholders will be
held jointly and severally liable for all the acts, errors, and omissions of the corporation's
employees. See COLO. R. PROF. SERV. CORP. § 265 (1973).
Some professions which have promulgated rules permitting members to form professional
corporations allow member shareholders to have limited liability only if adequate insurance
is procured. For example, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants passed a
resolution stating:
The stockholders of professional corporations or-associations shall be jointly and sev-
erally liable for the acts of a corporation or association, or its employees-except
where professional liability insurance is carried, or capitalization is maintained, in
amounts deemed sufficient to offer adequate protection to the public. Liability shall
not be limited by the formation of subsidiary or affiliated corporations or associations
each with its own limited and unrelated liability.
AICPA, Vol. B, ET Appendix C, 5141 (CCH, June 1984).
19871
588 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:571
fessionals who desire to incorporate but who are unsure about how incor-
poration would affect their personal liability exposure.
Laura R. Brown
